

# **Opinion Poll: Attitudes, Perceptions, Expectations and Frustrations**

## **Liberated Area**

*May 27-June 1, 2000*

*Prepared By  
Information International SAL  
May-June 2000*

## 1. Introduction

After more than 22 years of occupation, Israel has withdrawn from over one hundred villages and towns in South Lebanon. The withdrawal has led to widespread relief and has restored hope in the future of Lebanon, particularly among the inhabitants of the South. However, liberation did little to alleviate the dire conditions caused by years of occupation: Thousands of destroyed or dilapidated homes, thousands in displaced people, thousands of handicapped, orphans and old people, and a completely wrecked economic infrastructure or, where existent, linked to the occupying forces.

## 2. Description of the Sample


Pursuant to its policy of contributing to human and national concerns by providing an objective evaluation of pending questions and prevailing issues through scientifically conducted polls and surveys, Information International has accorded the highest of priorities to the situation in the South, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. It has, accordingly, conducted a field survey during the period between 27<sup>th</sup> of May and 1<sup>st</sup> of June, covering the various Southern areas, in order to ascertain the facts and conditions under which the inhabitants are living, and determine the development needs. 600 questionnaires were distributed, covering both the South and the Western Bekaa areas, 65% of which were distributed in the first area and 35% in the second.

As for the distribution according to the Caza, it was done as follows: 35% in Hasbaya, 29.8% in Marjioun, 16.8% in Bint Jbeil, 11.7% in Jezzine, 6.7% in Tyr. The respondents were divided according to gender as follows: 61% male versus 39% female.


The questionnaire also included respondents of various age groups; with those within the 18-24 year bracket comprising 20.7%, compared to 26% aged between 25-34. While those between 35-54 years made up for 36.3% of the total number of respondents, those aged above 55 constituted 17% of the sample. It is noteworthy that the margin of error allowed in this survey is only 3%.

## Part I Liberated Areas Socio-Demographic Profile

Figure 1



**Figure 2**



**Figure 3**




Figure 4






Figure 5




Furthermore, in an attempt to draw a more accurate picture of the realities under which southerners live with their families, it should be made clear that the main proportion (50.9%) of the population own their own homes in the village, while 45% own a home along with a piece of land, and another percentage of 4.2% own only land (Figure 6).

**Figure 6**




As for those who own a home outside their villages in the South, they accounted for only 24.9% versus 75.1% who did not own any such home. For the former, their ownership claims was to homes in different cities, towns and villages, the capital coming in first place with 57.2% owning homes in Beirut, while 6.7% own homes in the city of Saida (Figure 7).

**Figure 7**



Also, in Tyr, a vast proportion of respondents (73.7%) claimed they owned a home and a piece of land in the village, versus a percentage of 68.2% in Hasbaya. As for Jezzine, a majority of 73.2% declared the ownership of a home in the village, while in Marjioun the proportion was of 80% and 57.4% in Bint Jbeil.

**Figure 8**



**Figure 9**






Figure 10



The average number of family members actually residing in their villages is 5, with most of the respondents pointing to the fact that 22% of their family members have emigrated, versus 28% that have migrated to Beirut and its outskirts (Figure 11).

Figure 11



## Part II Realities, Needs and Priorities


The long Israeli occupation of the South has led to difficult human and demographic conditions, due to the displacement of entire families, and to the destruction and desertion of countless villages, in addition to causing a massive migration movement towards the capital. Today, families who stood fast during all those years, are reuniting and welcoming relatives who had been forced to leave by the occupation. These residents comprise 70.8% of the total sample, whereas visitors from other regions count for 9.5%; and the displaced willing to go back 4.3%. The remaining small percentage of 0.4% accounts for those commuting between their respective villages in the South and the Capital.

The proportion of residents in each village differed according to regions and as follows: 86.7% of the respondents in Hasbaya stated that they still reside in the village versus 74.9% of the inhabitants of Marjioun, 71.4% of those in Jezzine, 74.5% in Tyre and 39.6% in Bint Jbeil.

### Should the South Be Declared a Disaster Area?

68.8% of the respondents agree to the need of declaring the South a disaster area. (Figure 12).

**Figure 12**




What Are the Five Issues in the South To Which the Government Should Accord High and Immediate Priority?

According to Southerners today, the priorities are as follows:


First, the reconstruction and the development of the South (49.1%); Second, the security issue and the deployment of the army (16.7%); Third, to compensate to the inhabitants of the liberated villages (14%); Fourth, to create job opportunities in order to encourage the inhabitants to stay on the land and not look elsewhere for sustenance (10.4%); Fifth, to assure the return of the displaced (2%). The above- mentioned issues were followed by a large number of priority problems, expressed in lesser degrees: The prosecution of collaborators for example, redressing the economic situation and other issues measured in percentages of around 1.8% to 0.1% (Figure 13).

**Figure 13**




Viewed with more details, the afore-mentioned results show that the displaced willing to return to their villages, were hesitant in specifying a definite date. Their answers came as follows: 24.5% stated that they will return after re-building their homes, 20.8% prefer to wait for a clearer situation; While 11.3% were unable to give a date, 9.4% are waiting for a complete withdrawal to be achieved. The remaining percentages were distributed over dates that varied between a month, three months and a year (Figure 14).

Figure 14




As for the unwillingness of some displaced to return to their villages, this was due to a number of reasons and obstacles reported as follows: 32.6% due to unemployment and lack of job opportunities, 18.9% due to a lack in housing facilities, 18.3% due to inadequate financial opportunities in the region, 12% due to the absence of well-developed educational institutions, 8% due to the destitution in the area, 5.7% due to fear from an eventual Israeli come-back as well as other reasons shown clearly in Figure 15.

**Figure 15**



Noteworthy are the responses made to the question regarding the role of the government in reviving the South and helping the inhabitants. There is an obvious increase in confidence towards the Lebanese government, a feeling derived from the trust in the new president. For 70.8% of the respondents declared their belief that the government apparatuses will offer financial aid to the southerners and reconstitute the infrastructure scrupulously and conscientiously (Figure 16).

**Figure 16**




What Is the Government Institution Best Suited to Oversee Infrastructure Development Work in the Liberated Areas of the South; and Do You Trust the Government in this Regard?

The highest priority for the government today, is to reconstruct the infrastructure of the liberated villages, for it is considered to be the jugular vein of any development policy in the future.

As for the institutions that the respondents entrust to do the work, they ranked as follows: 22.2% for the Council of the South, followed by the Office of the Prime Minister (21.2%), and the concerned ministry (20.8%). The following figure shows a more detailed and thus clearer picture (Figure 17).


**Figure 17**



The division of the responses according to sectarian lines, indicated that the majority of Sunni respondents prefer the option of the Office of the Prime Minister with 33% vote; followed closely by the Druze who agree with a 32.6%; the Maronites also agree but to a lesser degree with 22.2%. As for the Shiites, a 26.1% majority prefers that the Council of the South undertake the reconstruction work; whereas the Orthodox and Catholics opted for the concerned ministry (30.4% and 31.8% respectively)

The distribution of responses according to residents and non-resident status in the village included in the survey, show that the majority of residents (25.8%) prefer that the Office of the Prime Minister undertake the development of infrastructure work in the South, versus 23% of non-residents who mentioned their preference for the Council of the South. (Figure 17-A).


Figure 17A



The Effect of the Israeli Withdrawal on the South in General and on Your Personal Situation in Particular


The results of the poll conducted, show a noteworthy increase in the ratio of those who believe in the positive effect of the Israeli withdrawal and the ensuing prosperity after years of negligence and destitution. 71.5% support this theory versus an 11.2% who think differently and a 17.3% who have no idea (Figure 18).

**Figure 18**




As for the effect of the withdrawal on the financial improvement per individual respondent, it depended largely and directly on “income related to occupation presence ratio”. Thus, while a majority of 79% declare its income is unaffected by the withdrawal, a 21% admit a detrimental economic loss (Figure 19).

**Figure 19**



Also, an overwhelming majority (98.2%) of respondents deny receiving any practical aid after the liberation, while another category of only 1.8% who claim to have received such assistance (Figure 20).

**Figure 20**



### **Part III**

## **Security: Perceptions of Current Realities and Future Outlook**

The Israeli withdrawal from the South has established a new reality that has had repercussions on the whole of Lebanon. The deck has been reshuffled and a new hand dealt. This has given rise to many questions concerning the future of the area, as well as the new policies to be drawn.

The following questions focus on Israel's intentions and the reaction they entail. Hence, whereas 72.3% of respondents agree that Israel has definitively withdrawn from Lebanon and will not attack again, 10.3% did not agree. Also, and according to a distribution based on religious affiliation, the Sunnis agree to the premise by 89.4%, whereas the Druze agree by 86%, the Shiite by 67.5%, the Maronites by 65%, Catholics 57.1% and Orthodox 53.3%.

As for the assumption that Israel still intends to launch a ruthless war, it was refuted by 73.7% of the respondents versus 10.1% who agreed and 16.2% of non-committals.

The Lebanese official position demands an Israeli withdrawal from the Shiba'a Farms, considered to be Lebanese soil, whereas Israel agrees to a meager 10% withdrawal from the total surface area of the stretch, claiming that it is the only part belonging to Lebanon. The fate of the rest will remain pending a future agreement with Syria. 70% of the respondents indicate their belief that Israel will withdraw completely from Shiba'a, versus 19.2% who do not agree. Another 67.3% do not agree to a possible partial withdrawal from Shiba'a. However, the majority (80%) of respondents agree that the withdrawal from the South was effected unconditionally.

Moreover, the main percentage of respondents (85.7%) refuses any commercial ties with Israel, deemed as the main basis of normalization, and one of its many facets. The majority, regardless of religious affiliations, expressed their refusal to any trade and touristic cooperation with Israel, whereas the percentage of those who differed was small: 21.4% of Catholics, 13.9% of Maronites and 10% of Orthodox.

As for the eventuality of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel without Syria, the main proportion of respondents (75.7%) were against such a suggestion.

No prominent divergences along sectarian lines were noted in the reaction of respondents when asked the above-mentioned question; only a small difference was noted in the percentage rise of those who disagreed among the Druze (80.4%), the Shiites (80.3%), the Sunnites (77.7%) and the Catholics (75%). The same percentage then fell to 70% for the Orthodox and 64.2% for the Maronites.


### The Views of Respondents on the Actors Responsible for the Liberation of the South

The percentage of those who agreed that the South was liberated due to the steadfastness of its inhabitants reached 95.6%, whereas 91.2% conceded to the might of the Islamic Resistance, and 79% to the Lebanese army. The percentage falls to 37.2% when asked if the liberation was the outcome of the force of political action; and only 19.3% agreed that liberation was due to the efforts deployed by the Southern MPs .

### Should the South Be Declared in a State of Emergency?

The percentage rises to 87.5% in agreement to declaring a state of emergency (Figure 21).


**Figure 21**



What Was Your Immediate Reaction to the Israeli Withdrawal and Were You Expecting it?

The sudden withdrawal, prior to the earlier set date of July 7 of the year 2000, has led to a feeling of relief and exhilaration. 74% of the respondents declared that they felt elated and filled with an indescribable feeling of joy. While only 7.4% expressed surprise at the sudden withdrawal and 5% felt moral and inner satisfaction. The remaining answers showed different other reactions, some of which expressed fear and apprehension (Figure 22).

**Figure 22**




There were no significant divergences of views noted, when responses were divided along sectarian lines. What is noteworthy, however, is that a high percentage of Christians declared they were gripped by feelings of fear and apprehension in the wake of the invasion, whereas this proportion was negligible among Muslims .

Significantly, however, a high proportion of respondents (73.2%) claimed they were not expecting such a withdrawal, a fact that underlines the element of surprise that prevailed.

What Authority Is Most Qualified to Assume the Responsibility of Securing the South?


The security vacuum left by the Israeli withdrawal has instigated a series of questions concerning the authority best qualified to take control of the situation. Although the government was quick in giving several reasons for not sending the army, what is surprisingly notable is the large percentage of respondents (75.8%) demanding the deployment of the Lebanese army; followed by a lower percentage (10.8%) calling for the UN, and 6.8% for the Internal Security Forces. Only 3.5% ask for the joint presence of the army and the Internal Security Forces versus a 1.5% who want the joint presence of the United Nations Forces and the army. As for political parties assuming security responsibilities, only 1.3% of the respondents supported the suggestion versus a 0.3% who asked for all of the above mentioned (Figure 23).

**Figure 23**



An overwhelming feeling of desire was noted among the respondents of various sects for the deployment of the army in the liberated villages and Southern cities as well as for its subsequent control of the situation. No major differences in views were discernable among the different sects (Figure 23-A).


Figure 23A



Which Side Best Supported the South during its Occupation

When respondents were asked which side best supported the South during the years of occupation, Hizbullah comes in the forefront with 32.7% of the vote. Followed by 18% for the Islamic Resistance, 12% for the Lebanese government and 2.5% for the Red Cross and the same percentage for Syrian efforts. These are then followed by other players cited by respondents, albeit in lower percentages, like the Amal movement, the Council of the South, Iran, the Guardians of the Cedars and many other parties (Figure 24).

**Figure 24**



### Expectations for the Future of the Liberated South

57.7% of the residents believe that the work of politicians in the South is related to parliamentary elections; and division along sectarian lines, indicates that 83.3% of Orthodox agree that politicians might abuse of the liberation issue for petty gains, versus 82.1% of Catholics, 70.8% of Maronites and 66% Shiites. Whereas the majority (68.1%) of Sunnis do not agree with this premise, 54.2% of the Druze do.


Although a large percentage (71.3%) does not agree to the eventuality of confessional conflict erupting, as propagated by some, this is rejected by 87.2% of the Sunni, 84.1% of the Druze, 86% of the Shiites and 76.7% of the Orthodox. The percentage then falls of to 58.4% of Maronites who do not agree, with 50% of Catholics.

The views concerning the return of the Palestinians to their homeland with Israeli consent, are divided as follows: 47.7% do not agree, 30.8% agree, while 21.5% are indifferent. The difference in the views of the respondents becomes obvious when divided along sectarian lines: For 63.8% of Sunnis agree to the eventuality along with 57% of the Druze, while the 58.1% Shiite majority disagrees with the premise, along with 57.1% of Catholics and 54% of Maronites. An increase is noted within the Orthodox community, attaining the 63.3% (agreement).

It is noteworthy that the overwhelming feeling of hope in the ranks of the respondents and their confidence in the forthcoming period; for the majority (75.4%) feel safe, and with their families, in their villages. Though a divergence in views becomes apparent along sectarian lines, with the main percentage of Druze (96.3%), Sunnis (95.7%) and Shiites (83.7%) agreeing to the feeling of safety; The percentage then drops to 53.3% for Orthodox and 48.2% for Maronites. As for the Catholics, a majority of 64.3% reject the presence of safety.

The percentage of agreement rises to 82.5% concerning the return of Southerners to their homes after years of forced migration. The hope of a return in view of reconstructing homes and reviving the area also is high ranging from 99.1% within the Druze Community, 96.8% in the Sunni and 87.2% in the Shiite community. The percentage then drops to 65% for Maronites, 56.7% for Orthodox and 50% for Catholics (Figure 25).

**Figure 25**




What Are the Expectations for the Future?

The Lebanese government has not, to date, sent its army to the South. It has decided to settle for the deployment of the Internal Security Forces (I.S.F.) in a political stand opposed by certain segments of the society and accepted by others.

A major percentage (89.6%) of respondents support an imminent deployment of the army in the South, another 85.2% agree to the possibility of a smooth UNIFIL deployment along the borders. 87.8% believe that the government will accord the South the highest priority and 81.7% that it will give aid to the displaced. A large percentage of respondents oppose any commercial links with Israel (85.7%) versus a meager 7.5% of those who consent to such a trade while 6.8% refuse to comment.

As for the future of Hizbullah and the possibility of continued operations led by the resistance, 39.3% of the respondents consent to it versus 40.5% who disagree and 20.2% are undecided. As for the eventuality of Hizbullah continuing its Katyusha attacks on Israel, respondents in a large percentage (61.5%) disagree, while only 17.7% agree and 20.8% are undecided (Figure 26).

**Figure 26**



A difference in attitude is noted when responses are divided according to place of residence and to the region.

A division of the same responses adopting the sectarian variable yields the following results: A clear divergence in views between Muslims and Christians, with another schism amongst Muslims themselves. The Christians in their majority 36.7% for Orthodox, 28.5% for Maronites, and 21.4% for Catholics believe that no-one was interested in the South during that period. Whereas the Sunnis say the Islamic Resistance by 31.9%, the Shiites say Hizbullah by 55.2% followed by the Druze by 32.7%.

A clear consensus arose among respondents of various sects when asked if the liberation was due to the might of the Islamic resistance, and no striking divergences were apparent.

Difference in proportions was noted among respondents between village residents and non-residents, on whether the efforts of Southern MPs were responsible for liberation, 17.9% of the residents agreed versus 22.8% of non-residents.

The percentage of those who agreed that the South was liberated due to a strong and stable Syrian-Lebanese relation attained 72.8%, whereas 79.7% agreed to the same statement concerning the support by Iran .

A clear sectarian schism appears in response to a question on whether the power of Syrian-Lebanese relation helped liberate the South: A rise in the percentage of respondents who agreed within the Muslim community, to an 87.9% of the Druze, 84% of the Sunni and 78.8% of the Shiite. The percentage then fell within the Christian community to 56.7% for Orthodox, 54.7% for Maronites and 39.3% for Catholics.

71.8% agreed that the South was liberated as a result of Amal's might, a lower percentage (47.5%) was noted when asked to agree to the role of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in the liberation. The Communist Party was selected by 41%, and the Progressive Socialist Party by 34% .

Village residents appear more confident in the role of the parties in the liberation of South Lebanon than non-residents.


Significantly, the Druze voted for the Lebanese government by 27.1% , a percentage that is significantly lower among other religious communities.

Another significant point is the difference in views depending on the place of residency.

What Do You Expect of the Political Parties?

As for the respondents' expectations from the political parties for the coming period, they focused mainly on giving aid to the inhabitants, subscribed to by 21.7%. Followed by 16.1% who expected them to help the army deploy in the area, and 14% to conduct awareness campaigns and other cultural activities. Other various responses accounted for 4.4% to 2% (Figure 27).


**Figure 27**



## Part IV Perceived Image of South Lebanese Army (SLA)

As for the Lahd Militiamen, 51.2% of the respondents believe they are collaborators, while 29.5% consider they had no choice, 10.3% agree to both of the above and 9% are unable to take a stand (Figure 28).


**Figure 28**



Although the Lahd Militia comprised men from all Lebanese religious communities, it seems that Christians sympathized with their plight more than Muslims. Whereas they are considered collaborators by most of the Shiites 75.9%, the Sunnites 70.2% and the Druze 54.2%; The main percentage of Catholics 64.3%, Orthodox 63.3% and Maronites 61.3% consider them helpless in the matter, which explains the lenient stand taken in regard to their judgement .


A difference is also noted in the description given of the Lahd Militiamen (SLA) between residents that never left their villages and those who did. This is clearly shown in Figure 28A (Figure 28-A).

**Figure 28A**




The people who fled to Israel, collaborators or otherwise, were incited to run by the oppressive feeling of fear and apprehension that reigned on the eve of the withdrawal; While 45.8% of the respondents consider them all to be collaborators on the whole, 40.2% do not agree to such an assumption and 14% are non-committal (Figure 29).

**Figure 29**



The responses of residents and non-residents are divided along the lines depicted in Figure 29A (Figure 29-A).


**Figure 29A**



However, the SLA Militiamen themselves are divided between those who turned themselves in to the Lebanese Judicial authority, and those who fled to Israel.

The government's call for the return of those who fled is approved by 59.8% of the respondents, who deem it to be the best way to deal with the deserters. As for the non-committals, they make up for 11% of the respondents, with 7.2% asking for pardon and 6.5% for life imprisonment and 6.2% for execution. Many suggestions for prison terms are made, ranging from a year to 5 and more (Figure 30).

**Figure 30**




Respondents of various religious communities are unanimous in their support for the need to call for the return of all members of the Lahd militia who had fled to Israel, and for their subsequent surrender to state authority.

Some differences were however noted, with the area of residency being a determining factor.

It should also be made clear, that when asked to take a stand vis-à-vis the prosecution of around 1600 Militia members (SLA) who had turned themselves in, the large proportion of respondents (40.3%) is unable to do so and give a “don’t know” answer. This is countered with a 21.5% that call for amnesty to be granted to all SLA Militia members. While other answers came as follows: 7.7% calling for a prison sentence of less than a year, a same percentage for a prison term of 3 to 5 years. Another 5.6% demand a year to three years prison sentences, while a further percentage demand life imprisonment. As for those who call for capital punishment, they counted for only 4.5% (Figure 31).


**Figure 31**



Despite the manifestations of National Unity in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, and the absence of any violence with religious overtones, the results of the study show a huge discrepancy among respondents divided along sectarian lines. It becomes apparent after the fact, that Muslims and Christians perceive collaborators differently, with the Orthodox 53.3%, the Maronite 47.4% and the Catholics 71.4% calling for the pardon of collaborators versus a very low percentage of Muslims sharing the same view (8.5% Sunnites, 7.5% Druze, 5.9% Shiites). For the main percentage within the Muslim community responded with “I don’t know”: 59.6% Sunni, 48.6% Druze, and 36.9% Shiites. The other responses are distributed in negligible percentages over other punishment measures included in the questionnaire.

Another evidence of the depth of the rift lies in the view vis-à-vis collaborators. The absolute rejection of capital punishment in Christian responses, whereas it reached 4.7% in Druze responses, 5.3% in Sunni and 8.4% in Shiite responses. Some discrepancies were also evident between the responses of inhabitants who steadfastly stayed in their villages compared with those who left, on how to deal with the Militia SLA members who turned themselves in to the State.


Figure 31A



## Part V Perceived Image of Israel

The attitude concerning Israel, differs amongst the respondents, with a 46.8% declaring Israel an enemy that should be defeated; and a 43.5%, an enemy with whom it would be preferable to maintain a status-quo of neither war nor peace. Only a small percentage of 4.3% believe that the foe can turn into friend, and another 5.4% are unable to take a stand (Figure 32).

**Figure 32**



What is remarkable in the results of the study, is the obvious difference in the way both Christians and Muslims perceive Israel. Although the main majority of Sunnis 78.7% and Druze 71% consider Israel an enemy that should be fought, the main percentage of Maronites 54.7%, Orthodox 66.7% and Catholics 64.3% consider it an enemy with whom a status-quo should be maintained. It should also be noted that the Shiite themselves are divided with 50.9% agreeing to the latter answer, while 44.8% to the former, i.e. Israel is an eternal enemy.

As for those who consider Israel a foe that can turn into friend, while they are non-existent within the Muslim community, reach 21.4% in the Catholic community, 10.9% in the Maronite and 6.7% in the Orthodox community.

A similarity is noted in the attitudes concerning Israel, between the respondents who steadfastly stayed in their villages and those who left, with the majority of both categories agreeing that Israel is an enemy that should be defeated (47.3% and 45.7% respectively) (Figure 32-A).

Figure 32A




Figure 33





Figure 33A



As for those who dealt on industrial or commercial levels, they are considered by 50.7% of respondents as collaborators, and by 33.2% as helpless, while 6.8% consider them to be both of the above. 9.3% are unable to take a stand .

The various religious communities had similar views concerning individuals who had dealings with Israel during the occupation, as those regarding collaborators in general. For the majority of Muslims consider them collaborators (Shiites 68%, Sunnis 69% and Druze 67.3%), whereas the main portion of Christians consider them as helpless, having no choice (Maronites 65.7%, Catholics 60.7%, Orthodox 60%) .

Divergences also are noted in the responses of residents versus non-residents, on how to deal with collaborators.